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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the extraordinary rise and fall of police powers to stop-and-search 
without suspicion in public places in England and Wales. Suspicionless searches – 
authorised by s.60 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and s.44 Terrorism Act 
2000 – rose to a peak of 360,000 in 2009 and then declined radically to fewer than 
1,000 in 2016. The paper seeks to explain changes in the use of suspicionless search 
powers drawing on a theory of the relationship between law and policing by examining 
the police ‘working environment’ comprised of three structures: law, work and 
politics. The paper concludes with a consideration of recent reforms of stop-and-search 
powers and the implications for the future of suspicionless searches. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper examines dramatic changes in the use of ‘suspicionless searches’ – the 
police power to stop-and-search people in public places without any suspicion of 
wrongdoing. The paper falls into seven parts. First, we consider the principles that 
circumscribe police power – specifically the doctrine of the ‘rule of law’ and the axiom 
that the state should be restrained from interfering with the private life and liberty of 
the individual without good grounds. We consider, specifically, the proposition that 
there should be no power to stop-and-search unless there is reasonable suspicion that 
the person stopped is involved in criminal activity. The paper then draws on police 
research to grind a theoretical lens through which to examine the relationship between 
‘law in the books’ (in the form of statutes and cases) and ‘law in action’ (in the form of 
stop-and-search practice).  
 
In light of this theoretical framework we examine stop-and-search in more detail and in 
particular the creation of novel powers to search people without suspicion. In part III, 
we turn to official statistics to tease out changes in the use of stop-and-search powers. 
We then consider possible explanations for the rise and subsequent fall of the powers, 
by examining changes in the social and political context within which police powers 
are exercised, the role of legislative, judicial and civil society organisations and 
changes within police forces. We then consider the recent Home Office review of stop-
and-search powers and the current political landscape and finally, we examine the 
implications for the future of police powers to search without reasonable suspicion. 
 
Our argument, in a nutshell, is that the dramatic changes in police use of suspicionless 
search powers can be explained by the nature of the police ‘working environment’ 
comprised of three structures: law, politics and work. The statutes that granted the 
power to search people without suspicion were the result of a political process; 
however, the way in which they were used and how extensively, were shaped by a 
much more complex relationship between law, politics and work. Case law, in a 
permissive or restrictive capacity, contributed to the working environment in which 
police use their discretionary powers. Significant changes in working practice came 
about through internal changes in police operational policy and occupational culture; 
these were, in turn, the result of interaction with the external legal and political 
environment. The example of suspicionless searches helps to explain how statute and 
case law, the political environment and the internal world, or habitus, of policing shape 
police operational practice. 
 
Towards a theory of law in policing 
 
In attempting to explain the dramatic rise and fall in the police use of suspicionless 
search powers, we hope to make some progress in answering a more general question: 
to what extent does change in the law (a legislative act or a judicial decision) account 
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for changes in police practice (stop and search, crime investigation, public order 
policing, etc.). The relationship between law and policing been studied by 
criminologists but relatively neglected by legal scholars. 1 Thirty years ago, Baldwin 
and Kinsey pointed to a fundamental theoretical and conceptual inadequacy in the 
British debates about police reform:  
 
…[it] completely ignored one of the key questions, namely the role of legal rules in regulating 
police behaviour… Nobody thought to ask whether, how and why police would get around the 
rules. No research was done on the extent to which the police were hindered by a lack of powers, 
on the reasons why officers fail to adhere to rules, on alternative ways of regulating police 
behaviour… or on the ways that rules operated under different policing strategies.2 
 
Dixon sets out a theoretical model drawing on the ‘Warwick School’ (McConville, 
Sanders and Leng),3 Kinsey and Baldwin,4 the Oxford socio-legal scholar McBarnett,5 
criminologists Grimshaw and Jefferson 6 and the more recent work of Janet Chan. 7 
Although these authors, whose theoretical tools were largely developed during the late 
1970s and 1980s, come from different perspectives, their work is united by detailed 
analysis of policework in practice understood in its broader legal, political and cultural 
context. For Reiner, the challenge is to understand how ‘blue letter law’ – the police 
use of ‘law in action’ – contrasts with ‘black letter law’ in the books.8 In this section 
we explore theories of policing in order to derive a framework for understanding the 
role of law in policework. 
 
A starting point is the ‘rule of law’, a doctrine to which most modern governments 
claim to adhere, which means that no one – private citizen, government minister or 
official – is above the law. 9  It dictates that governmental authority may only be 
legitimately exercised in accordance with settled, written laws adopted and enforced 
through ‘due process’ in accordance with procedures that are clear and known in 
advance. The doctrine is contested and its definition soft around the edges, but the rule 
of law narrative in western democracies contains core principles to which state actors 
must adhere. The primary principle for the purpose of this discussion is that law should 
restrain the exercise of discretionary state powers; these should be: exercised within 
                                            
1 David Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police Practices (Clarendon Press 1997) i.  
2 Robert Baldwin and Richard Kinsey (1985) ‘Rules, Realism and the Police Act’ Critical Social Policy 
12: 89-102 at page 89, cited by Dixon 1997, px 
3 Mike McConville. Andrew Sanders and Roger Leng (1991) Case For the Prosecution: Police Suspects 
and the Construction of Criminality. London: Routledge 
4 Robert Baldwin and Richard Kinsey (1982) Police Powers and Politics. London: Quartet 
5 Doreen McBarnet, D. (1981), Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice, London: 
Macmillan. David Dixon (1997) Law in Policing. Oxford: Clarendon. 
6 Roger Grimshaw and Tony Jefferson (1984) Interpreting Policework. London: Allen & Unwin; Roger 
Grimshaw and Tony Jefferson (1984) Controlling the Constable: Policing Accountability in England 
and Wales. London: Allen & Unwin. 
7 Janet Chan (1997) Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
8 Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police (4th Edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 209. 
9 Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66 The Cambridge Law Journal 67; Tom Bingham, The Rule 
of Law (Penguin 2011); Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford University Press 2003). 
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stated criteria applicable to the individual affected, objectively verifiable and amenable 
to legal challenge.10 Rule of law doctrine aims to ensure that societies are governed 
within a framework that respects individual autonomy and protects citizens from 
arbitrary interference by the state. 
 
This principle is important in policing where the discretionary use of power is 
pervasive. Indeed, one of the most important ‘discoveries’ of police research is that 
policing is, by nature, highly discretionary.11  Empirical research shows that police 
officers generally ‘under-enforce’ the law using their discretion to deal with incidents 
using a variety of ‘peacekeeping’ methods even when an offence has been 
committed.12 Crucial for understanding the relationship between law and policing is 
that ‘discretion increases as one moves down the [policing] hierarchy.’13 This means 
that ‘the rank-and-file officer is the primary determinant of policing where it really 
counts: on the street.’ 14  In the British tradition, broad police discretion is neither 
accidental nor simply a function of the practical impossibility of full enforcement. 
Rather, it is enshrined in the doctrine of ‘constabulary independence.’15 
 
This common law doctrine, oft cited as a founding principle of British policing and 
supported by a century of case law, states that police constables should be ‘answerable 
to the law and the law alone.’16 In this model, police decision-making – operational 
policy and the individual constable’s actions on the ground – should not and cannot be 
directed or controlled by any national or local politician or institution. As Hugh Orde, 
former president of the Association of Chief Police Officers, described it, this doctrine 
makes the police ‘autonomous professional agents of the law’, deliberately insulated 
from political control.17 This conscious design ‘allows the police to rely on expertise, 
judgment and experience in taking professional decisions on operational policing.’ 
Despite decades of changes in the constitutional position of the police and of police 
accountability mechanisms, the Chief Constable remains sovereign in deciding 
‘operational matters’ and the individual officer in deciding how to use his or her 
powers in any given situation. This raises a question: to what extent can changes in 
police stop-and-search practice can be explained by changes in the law? This speaks to 
the more general question of how law interacts with other factors to shape police 
operational practice. 18  Three theoretical models of policing – the legal-machine, 
                                            
10 Bingham, The Rule of Law 50. 
11 Joseph Goldstein, ‘Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in 
the Administration of Justice’ (1960) 69 The Yale Law Journal 543. 
12 Reiner 19. 
13 James Q Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Harvard University Press 1968) 7. 
14 Reiner 116. emphasis added. 
15 Lawrence Lustgarten, The Governance of the Police (Sweet & Maxwell 1986); Dixon; Reiner. 
16 Lord Denning, R v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, ex-parte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118, 
[136]. 
17 Hugh Orde, ‘Tension Between Politicians and Police Is Healthy’ The Times (London, 18 August 
2011). 
18 See also Ben Bowling and James Sheptycki (2015) ‘Global policing and transnational rule with law’ 
Transnational Legal Theory, Volume 6 (1) pp141-173 
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subcultural and environmental – can be delineated as a starting point for this 
investigation. 
 
The Legal-Machine Model 
 
The legal ‘machine model’19 or ‘legalistic-bureaucratic conception’20 is the dominant 
theoretical model of the relationship between law and policing. It is based on a 
rational, bureaucratic view of how law regulates policework. Legalists argue that to 
understand policing we need only look at the laws governing it.21 From this perspective 
law is an authoritative statement of police goals, ‘carrying a clear meaning and 
relevance for all subordinates that they should automatically put into practice.’ 22 
Discrepancies between legal rules and operational practice result from 
‘communications blockage’: the law has simply not been properly communicated to 
those charged with its implementation. Legalists can be criticised for attending to how 
organisations ought to function rather than how they actually work in practice; but 
open the possibility of a precise understanding of the implementation of the law and 
how the structure of the police organisation facilitates (or debilitates) this. Empirical 
research shows that law influences practice in certain circumstances, but does not 
determine police policy and practice alone. Observations about police discretion lead 
us to examine the norms, values and working practices of street-level officers; in other 
words, to the study of police subculture. 
 
The Subcultural Model 
 
The subcultural model grew out of the sociological tradition of participant observation 
of street policing documenting the occupational milieu of policework and the norms, 
values, customs and working practices on the ground.23  Subculturalists provided a 
window into the hitherto closed world of policing – how the law is used by the 
constable on the street, how he or she makes sense of this work and of the various 
enabling and constraining factors that shape ‘the job’. This work has been accused of 
simplistic analysis of ‘canteen culture’, stereotyping police officers’ views and failing 
to recognise that what police officers say in the canteen is not necessarily related to 
what they do in practice. 24  It has also been criticised for taking a ‘cop sided’ 
                                            
19 Roger Grimshaw and Tony Jefferson, Interpreting Policework (Allen & Unwin 1987). 
20 Dixon. 
21 cf. ibid. 
22 Grimshaw and Jefferson. 
23 Michael Banton, The Policeman in the Community (Tavistock 1964); William A Westley, Violence 
and the Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom, and Morality (MIT Press 1971); Maureen E 
Cain, Society and the Policeman’s Role (Routledge 1973); Simon Holdaway, Inside the British Police: 
A Force at Work (Basil Blackwell 1983); Simon Holdaway, ‘Discovering Structure: Studies of the 
British Police Occupational Culture’ in Weatheritt (ed), Police Research (Avebury Press 1989); 
Bethan Loftus, Police Culture in a Changing World (Clarendon Press 2012). Ben Bowling and James 
Sheptycki, Global Policing (Sage 2012), esp chapter 4. 
24 PAJ Waddington, ‘Police (Canteen) Sub-Culture. An Appreciation’ (1999) 39 British Journal of 
Criminology 287. 
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perspective that fails to capture the complex relationships between policing and its 
wider context.25 
 
Chan’s theoretical work addresses the question of how to understand policing as law in 
context.26 Drawing on Bordieu and Sackman, Chan examines the habitus and the field 
of policing. The habitus consists of the cultural knowledge and informal structures 
within the police organization. The field consists of the social, economic, legal and 
political contexts that constitute the historical and contemporary relationships between 
the community and the police. Police practice can be seen as the interaction between 
the social and political context of police work in the field and the institutionalized 
perceptions, values, strategies and schemas that comprise the habitus. Police practice is 
the result of the interaction between habitus and field, a social space of conflict and 
competition in which participants struggle to establish control. The habitus is 
comprised of axiomatic knowledge (which constitutes the basic rationale for policing), 
dictionary knowledge (the categorization of people with whom the police come into 
contact), directory knowledge (which informs officers about how to ‘get things done’) 
and recipe knowledge (which prescribes ‘menus’ of acceptable and unacceptable 
practices in given situations).27 
 
Subculturalists claim that law is largely irrelevant to policework. They argue that the 
police use law simply as a resource to ‘get things done’ and dismiss the idea that law 
shapes police practice. Law is a ‘dead letter’ because rank-and-file subculture – 
impermeable to changes in law, policies, procedures or management – determines 
police behaviour. Discrepancies between policy and practice stem from a conflict 
between management and rank-and-file subculture. Managerial understanding of what 
is to be done is rooted in law but fails to affect rank-and-file policework, which is 
dominated by police-defined goals and objectives.28  For the subculturalists, law – 
issued in good faith or bad – is impotent and irrelevant to police practice. 
 
The subculturalists underestimate the role of law and overstate the influence of police 
occupational subculture, but help to fill the gap between the substance and the ideology 
of law.29 Subculturalists show how police expectations about the appropriate course of 
action in specific instances affect the outcome of police-public encounters. Procedural 
laws intended to govern police practice tend to be drafted permissively and give 
officers wide discretion to act as they see fit within situational exigencies. 30 
Understanding the relationship between law and practice requires analysis of the nature 
and scope of the law, the extent to which it is permissive, and the leeway for practice 
                                            
25 Bethan Loftus, Police Culture in a Changing World (Clarendon Press 2012). 
26 Chan. 
27 Ibid 76. 
28 David John Smith and Jeremy Gray, Police and People in London: The PSI Report, vol 4 (Gower 
Publishing Company Limited 1985). 
29 Doreen J McBarnet, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981) 5. 
30 Reiner 117. 
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to be shaped by police occupational subculture and the broader social, political and 
situational pressures on officers’ discretion. 
 
The Environmental model 
 
The most complete theory of policing is Grimshaw and Jefferson’s ‘environmental 
model.’31 Their starting point is JQ Wilson’s Varieties of Police Behaviour,32 which 
demonstrated an observable relationship between police officers’ working style, 
departmental policies and codes, and the prevailing political culture. This model 
requires cultural theories to be modified because it suggests that law, managerial 
strategies and political constraints ‘can affect at least some areas of police behaviour 
some of the time’. From this premise, Grimshaw and Jefferson develop a theory that is 
‘faithful to the profane details of daily policework’ but which links these to the ‘basic 
environmental features’ of the police organisation – management, organisational 
structures, processes, policies and codes, the constraints of the law and the prevailing 
political culture. These elements, they argue, explain the working ‘style’ of police 
officers. Grimshaw and Jefferson argue for an understanding of policing as shaped by a 
‘combination of structures’ specifically: law, work and the ‘democratic relation’.33  
 
Law 
To understand how law exerts its effects in particular situations it is necessary to know 
the ‘formal structure’ of the law – the legal powers of police, the legal demands made 
by the criminal law and criminal procedure, the legal powers of citizens and other legal 
authorities, such as the courts, prosecuting authorities or regulatory bodies. For 
Grimshaw and Jefferson, law is the determinant but not dominant structure of 
policework. The restrictive or permissive remit of any given law determines the extent 
to which other structures can influence police work, but the law itself does not 
dominate policing practice. It is crucial to understand the nature of the legal 
framework, its degree of precision and permissiveness in various situations, and its 
relationship with other structures. Having a concrete knowledge of legal powers and 
the degree of discretion embodied in them, ‘opens up the prospect of law being more 
or less influential, rather than influential or not, depending on the powers available. If 
these are highly discretionary, the less constraining will be the law, and vice versa’. 34 
 
Work 
Drawing on detailed empirical studies of policework, Grimshaw and Jefferson define 
work as a single structure with two dimensions: first, an ‘organisational’ element, the 
vertical dimension of rules, policies, procedures, command and control. Second, an 
occupational-cultural element referring to the horizontal dimension of norms, values, 
                                            
31 Grimshaw and Jefferson. 
32 Wilson. 
33 Grimshaw and Jefferson. 
34 Ibid 17. 
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practices and everyday routines of the work groups, most importantly the rank-and-file 
constable. 
 
The democratic relation – Politics 
Within the political domain, Grimshaw and Jefferson argue that policework is 
influenced and sometimes decisively shaped by the actions of a heterogeneous public 
composed of individuals and institutions outside the police organisation. They refer to 
this variously as ‘the democratic relation’, ‘community’ and  ‘the public’. The core of 
their argument is that ‘community’, through democratic mechanisms, has the potential 
to enable or constrain policy policy-making and practice. 35  In our view, a more 
succinct way of expressing the democratic relation is to refer to this as the ‘politics’ of 
policing.36 People come into contact with the police organisation in a variety of ways – 
as individual victim of crime, suspect, injured party, complainant, informant, or caller, 
as representatives of the community, as elected or self-appointed leaders of pressure 
groups, or members of organisations with which the police have institutional contact. 
This includes Members of Parliament and local counsellors, central government 
officials (especially the Home Office), local government officers, police authorities, 
regulators (such as the HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Independent Police 
Complaints Authority, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, etc.), as well as 
print and broadcast media. Each of these ‘political’ contacts can be conflictual or 
cooperative, sporadic or recurrent, with varying effects on both police policy and 
behaviour. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
In the attempt to understand how law, work and politics shape the police use of stop-
and-search powers, we draw on Grimshaw and Jefferson’s environmental theory, 
supplemented with ideas developed by Chan, to set out four general hypotheses: 
 
1. Police practice cannot be explained fully by any single factor – law, work, or 
politics – but only by the complex interaction between them.  
 
2. Law, being the determinant structure of policework, will dictate whether or not 
police officers may use a particular power but not how frequently police use 
their powers, against whom or under what circumstances.  
 
3. The less tightly and precisely the legal structure is articulated (or more 
discretionary and ambiguous), the more likely it is that police practice will be 
influenced by ‘occupational common sense’, managerial directives or political 
pressure. 
 
                                            
35 Grimshaw and Jefferson., p20-22 
36 Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police 
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4. Changes in the political environment contribute to shaping the axiomatic, 
directory and recipe knowledge within the police work environment, which in 
turn contributes to shaping police operational practice. 
 
These hypotheses guide our inquiry into the relationship between law and the use of 
suspicionless searches, but we acknowledge that the elements shaping police practice 
also feed into each other in different ways at different times. Developing an account of 
the relationship between law and policing involves looking at the way in which these 
elements interact over time. It is often difficult to separate the political elements from 
the broader context, or work-based elements from political developments. In what 
follows, we offer a narrative that develops over time, identifying the different elements 
as they come into play and returning to these hypotheses in the conclusion. First, we 
must examine the legal powers of stop-and-search and the extent of their use. 
 
The power to stop-and-search 
 
The conventional justification for the power to stop someone in the street and search 
their person, clothing, personal items, or their vehicle, is the police requirement for the 
legal tools to prevent and detect crime.37 Where a person is suspected of a criminal 
offence, going equipped to commit one, or having the fruits of criminal activity in their 
possession, the police should have the power to search them and then arrest or release 
them if the officer’s suspicions are allayed.38 By investigating people suspected of 
wrongdoing, crime can be detected and prevented and, in so doing, the police provide 
public safety and uphold their end of the social contract. 
 
It is axiomatic, therefore, that in a democracy no one should be stopped and searched 
by the police – with all the intrusions into privacy and interference with liberty that this 
entails – unless there are reasonable grounds to do so. This axiom has frequently been 
violated with respect to specific groups – for example vagrants, ‘habitual criminals’ 
                                            
37 Carole F. Willis (1983) The Use, Effectiveness and Impact of Police Stop and Search Powers, Home 
Office Research and Planning Unit Paper 15, London: Home Office.Lustgarten, L (2002) The Future 
of Stop and Search, Criminal Law Review 603.Ben Bowling and Estelle Marks, ‘Towards a 
Transnational and Comparative Perspective’ in Rebekah Delsol and Michael Shiner (eds), Stop and 
Search: The Anatomy of a Police Power (Routledge) 175. Ben Bowling and Leanne Weber (eds) Stop 
and Search: Police Power in Global Context. (Routledge 2012). Rebekah Delsol and Michael Shiner 
(2006) ‘Regulating stop and search: a challenge for police and community relations in England and 
Wales’, Critical Criminology, 14 (3), pp.241-263. Joel Miller (2010) ‘Stop and search in England: a 
reformed tactic or business as usual? ‘British Journal of Criminology, 50 (5), pp. 954-974.  John Ip 
(2013)  ‘The reform of counterterrorism Stop and Search after Gillan v United Kingdom’, Human 
Rights Law Review 13(4) pp.729-760. 
38 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s66 requires the Secretary of State to issue codes of 
practice in connection with the exercise of statutory powers by police officers. PACE Code A relates 
to the statutory powers of stop and search and requirements to record public encounters by police 
officers and staff. See Michael Zander The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (7th edition). 
(Sweet & Maxwell 2015). See also Paul Quinton (2011) The formation of suspicions: police stop and 
search practices in England and Wales, Policing and Society, 21(4), pp. 357-368.  
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and people of minority ethnic origin.39 Nonetheless, this remains a fundamental legal 
principle. Crucially, this legal axiom mirrors the views of the general public: people 
should be stopped only for genuinely good reasons; the police should be able to 
explain these reasons and should avoid stopping people randomly or routinely.40 
 
Section 1 of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (hereafter PACE) is the 
paradigm example of a stop-and-search power constrained by ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
and is – in theory at least – consistent with public views about how the power should 
be used. In theory, it balances the protection of personal liberty with the need to 
investigate allegations of criminal conduct. The PACE Codes of Practice state that ‘the 
primary purpose of stop-and-search powers is to enable officers to allay or confirm 
suspicions about individuals without exercising their power of arrest.’ It is therefore an 
‘intermediate power’ lying between arresting someone and doing nothing.  
 
Suspicionless search powers 
 
The 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (hereafter CJPOA) and the 2000 
Terrorism Act permit the police to stop-and-search without suspicion. As Lord Brown 
put it, this ‘radically ... departs from our traditional understanding of the limits of 
police power’.41 In the case of s.60 of the CJPOA, a police officer may stop any 
pedestrian or vehicle within an authorised area and search for offensive weapons or 
dangerous instruments, whether or not there are grounds to suspect that the person is in 
possession of such articles. Authorisations are made ‘in anticipation of violence’, that 
is when a senior officer reasonably believes incidents involving serious violence may 
take place in a locality or that people are carrying dangerous instruments or offensive 
weapons and considers it ‘expedient to give authorisation’ to use stop-and-search ‘to 
prevent their occurrence’. In the case of the (now repealed) s.44 of the Terrorism Act, 
and its replacement power s.47A, a police officer may stop a person or vehicle within 
an authorised area and conduct a search for articles ‘of a kind which could be used in 
connection with terrorism’. This power may be exercised whether or not the constable 
has grounds for suspecting the presence of such articles. Under s.44, authorisations by 
a senior officer could be made when considered ‘expedient for the prevention of acts of 
terrorism,’ a threshold that was raised to ‘necessary’ under s.47A. Authorisations under 
both s.44 and the new s.47A must be confirmed by the Secretary of State within 48 
hours, or cease to be effective. 
 
                                            
39 Ben Bowling and Coretta Phillips, ‘Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the Evidence on 
Police Stop and Search’ (2007) 70 The Modern Law Review 936; Leanne Weber and Ben Bowling, 
‘Valiant Beggars and Global Vagabonds: Select, Eject, Immobilize’ (2008) 12 Theoretical 
Criminology 355. 
40 Vanessa Stone and Nick Pettigrew, ‘The Views of the Public on Stops and Searches’ (Home Office, 
Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate 2000). 
41 R. (on the application of Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12 
 [74]. 
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The wording of s.44 and s.60 does not preclude the possibility of conducting searches 
at random. Although both s.60 and s.44 have specific purposes and permit searches 
only for specific items, they require no suspicion that the person stopped is carrying 
such items. It is not clear from the statute how far suspicion ought to guide the use of 
powers that do not require suspicion. Officers have unlimited discretion in choosing 
whom to stop, but in practice they tend to target individuals based on a ‘hunch’ or 
‘professional intuition’.42 We see here how common-sense work-values shape police 
practice. Research and statistical evidence confirms that people stereotyped by the 
police as more likely to be involved in crime and terrorism – e.g. those of African, 
Caribbean, middle-Eastern and Asian descent – are significantly more likely to be 
targeted than those from other groups. 43  In other words, suspicionless powers are 
targeted at ‘the usual suspects’. 
 
In contrast to s.1 PACE, suspicionless searches conflict with the rule of law principles 
described above. Both s.60 and s.44 placed unfettered power in the hands of individual 
officers, unrestrained by any requirement of suspicion – reasonable or otherwise – to 
interfere with the day-to-day lives of individuals. The ‘environmental’ theory of the 
relationship between law and police practice predicts that it is such highly 
discretionary powers that will be most extensively affected by shifts in police 
management, occupational common sense and prevailing political sentiments. Whilst 
these powers are referred to as ‘exceptional’ stop-and-search powers; the statistical 
data show that they quickly became a normal part of street policing. 
 
Stop-and-search Statistics 
 
Official records illustrate the astonishing rise and fall of suspicionless searches.44 In 
2001/2, the first full year of the operation of the 2000 Terrorism Act, the Home Office 
recorded 10,200 stops under s44. This quadrupled by 2006/7, then rose even more 
rapidly to almost 127,000 in 2007/8 and to a peak of over 210,000 in 2008/9. Recorded 
use then dropped sharply from 2009 to 2011, when s.44 was repealed and replaced by 
s.47A, which has not been used in England and Wales at the time of writing.  
 
In the first full year of its operation, the Home Office recorded close to 8,000 searches 
under s.60. It stayed at about this level until 1999/2000 when just over 6,800 searches 
were recorded. This nearly doubled the following year and continued to rise to a peak 
of over 150,000 in 2008/9. The use of the power then fell sharply, reaching a new low 
of around 1,000 searches in 2014/15 and 2015/16.  
 
Figure 1 Suspicionless Searches 
                                            
42 Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom (4158/05) (2010) 50 EHRR 45 [23] and [83]. 
43 Bowling and Phillips. 
44 Until 1998 these statistics were published in annual Home Office bulletins entitled Arrests for 
Notifiable Offences and the Operation of Certain Police Powers under PACE and from 1998 onwards 
in bulletins entitled Police powers and procedures, England and Wales. 
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There are some parallels with PACE searches. In the first year of its operation, police 
recorded just under 110,000 searches under s.1 rising tenfold over the next decade. 
While suspicionless searches were used sparingly in the early years of their existence 
at the peak in 2008/09 they accounted for 31% of all recorded searches. Subsequently 
the use of suspicionless search dropped much more swiftly than PACE searches and by 
2014/15 suspicionless searches made up only 0.2% of all searches.   
 
Stop-and-search data are no exception to the criminological rule that official statistics 
must be treated with caution. 45  The statistics presented above are compiled from 
records completed by the police officers conducting searches, collated by police forces 
and submitted to the Home Office. The data are, therefore, bound to be incomplete in 
various ways and are vulnerable to changes in police recording practice. Although 
making a record of a search is a statutory requirement, it is possible that changes in 
recorded stop-and-search have been influenced to some extent by changes in police 
officers enthusiasm for paperwork and their managers stringency in ensuring 
compliance with the PACE Codes of Practice. However, we have no reason to believe 
that the data are heavily influenced by changes in recording practice over time. The 
sheer magnitude of the rise and fall is also reason to think that official records reflect a 
real change in the use of these powers. We contend that, bearing in mind the above 
caveats, police records provide a reasonably valid and reliable indicator of patterns in 
police utilisation of stop-and-search powers.  
 
Explaining the Rise of Suspicionless Searches 
 
What explains the rise in the use of suspicionless searches? The obvious starting point 
is the law that granted new powers. It should be remembered that prior to 1994, the 
police did, in fact, conduct suspicionless searches. Research evidence showed that in a 
very large number of searches the grounds for PACE searches were vague and flimsy, 
did not satisfy the precondition of ‘reasonable suspicion’ and were therefore illegal.46 
Nonetheless, the grant of specific new powers explicitly legalised suspicionless 
searches that had previously been conducted outwith the law.  
 
The suspicionless search powers in the CJOPA 1994 were introduced by the 
Conservatives with the support of the Labour opposition. The law was introduced in 
the context of widespread concern regarding rising crime rates, football hooliganism, 
IRA terrorism and illegal raves. At the Conservative Party conference in October 1993 
Home Secretary Michael Howard outlined a 27 point-plan to crack down on crime. 
The CJOPA was a major part of this plan and ‘an important weapon in the fight against 
                                            
45 Dixon; Bowling and Phillips; Paul Quinton. 
46 Lustgarten; Dixon; Quinton. See also D. Brown, PACE Ten Years On: A Review of the Research, 
Home Office Research Study 155, Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate (London: Home 
Office, 1997 
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crime.’47 Labour’s support for the bill departed from their traditional civil liberties 
approach to the politics of law and order. Shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair 
convinced the Labour Party that it could not win a general election while appearing to 
be soft on crime. 48  The CJOPA enacted a number of controversial reforms and 
parliamentary debate centred on the abolition of the right to silence and the 
introduction of secure training facilities in the youth justice system rather than the 
extension of police powers. Despite its draconian nature Labour did not oppose the bill 
at second reading and it received Royal Assent on 3 November 1994. 49 
 
Suspicionless search powers were utilised sparingly for several years until just before 
Labour’s landslide election victory in 1997, when the political landscape shifted. The 
concept of zero-tolerance policing arrived from New York, where it was heralded a 
phenomenal success in preventing murder and other serious crime. Stop-and-search (or 
in the USA Stop-and-Frisk) is presented as a key weapon in the zero-tolerance policing 
toolbox, and in January 1997 Tony Blair committed New Labour to zero-tolerance 
tactics.50 By the time the Terrorism Act 2000 created permanent counter terrorism 
powers, suspicionless search rates had begun a steady climb. The New York terror 
attacks on 11 September 2001 undermined political opposition to the infringement of 
civil liberties. The threat of terrorism formed a large part of the broad context for the 
rise of suspicionless search. The events of 9/11 inspired deep-seated fear in the British 
public psyche, which were further entrenched by the 2004 Madrid bombings. These 
fears were realised on 7 July 2005 when terrorists attacked the London transport 
system, killing 52 people and injuring 700. In June 2007 an unexploded bomb was 
found in a car parked on Haymarket in central London and a partially successful attack 
was carried out at Glasgow International Airport.  
 
Pausing momentarily to consider our hypotheses set out above, this period shows 
understanding marked rises in the use of suspicionless search powers requires an 
environmental analysis. Although law permits the police to use particular powers, the 
frequency of their use requires understanding of the impact of significant events in the 
broader social and political field and the impact of these on the habitus of policing. The 
political endorsement of stop-and-search as tool to fight crime and terrorism shaped 
police operational policy and also occupational culture of policing. The language of 
zero tolerance, an emphasis on deterrence-based models of policing in political 
discourse and force policies, the importance of ‘getting results’ became part of the 
                                            
47 Martin Wasik and Richard D Taylor, Blackstone’s Guide to the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994 (Blackstone Press 1995). 
48 Keith D Ewing, Bonfire of the Liberties: New Labour, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law (Oxford 
University Press 2010). 
49 Tony Blair was delighted that his clever move foxed Conservative Home Secretary Michael Howard. 
He said in the Parliamentary Debates, ‘I wish that Conservative Back Benchers could have seen the 
right hon. and learned Gentleman's face drop about six inches when we told him that we did not intend 
to oppose the Second Reading.’ HC Deb 11 January 1994 vol 235 cc20-122. 
50 Benjamin Bowling, ‘The Rise and Fall of New York Murder: Zero Tolerance or Crack’s Decline?’ 
(1999) 39 British Journal of Criminology 531. 
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occupational common sense that shaped police operational practice. 51  The specific 
decision by the police to use s.44 more extensively and aggressively in the wake of 
international and domestic terrorist attacks is thus explicable not by reference to law, 
but by the space left by law for the influence of changes in the political environment.  
 
Understanding the rise of s.60 searches, which tracked the rise of s.44, requires an 
examination of the media attention surrounding a perceived growth in knife crime and 
the police response to it. Twenty-eight teenagers were killed in London in 2007 and 29 
in 2008, mostly by stabbing. As part of government and police response to public 
outrage the Metropolitan Police launched Operation Blunt 2 in May 2008 aimed at 
reducing the number of knives on London’s streets. A month after the launch of the 
operation a gang of teenagers murdered Ben Kinsella after a seemingly innocuous 
argument, the 17th stabbing death of a teenager in London that year.52 The murder 
grabbed media attention, prompted several anti-knife crime demonstrations and led to a 
review of knife crime sentencing.  
 
These developments gave tacit approval for aggressive use of stop-and-search and 
contributed to the surge in s.60 use. It is also appears that performance targets helped 
drive up the number of suspicionless searches. Officers in one study indicated they 
were assessed on yearly targets for stop-and-search. One officer identified ‘massive 
pressure’ to conduct more searches. Another stated that yearly assessments motivated 
them ‘to get out and do some more.’53 Here again, law in the books provides only a 
limited guide to understanding quite radical changes in the law on the streets. Here, an 
environmental theory is valuable to understanding the police use of law in terms of 
how frequently it is used, against whom it is targeted and for what reasons. The nature 
and extent of the use of the highly permissive s.60 power to stop and search without 
suspicion ‘in anticipation of violence’ is explicable as a result of the changing political 
context and the ways that this shapes the axiomatic, directory and recipe knowledge 
within the police working environment. 
 
The abuse of suspicionless searches 
 
Lord Carlile, appointed statutory independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in 2001, 
noted many examples of poor, unjustifiable or unnecessary use of s.44. 54 There were 
several examples of s.44 being used against protestors in 2003. In addition to its use at 
an arms fair, which gave rise to civil litigation (discussed below), it was used to halt an 
anti-war protest at RAF Fairford. Liberty, a civil liberties NGO, issued complaints to 
                                            
51 Ben Bradford and Jonathan Jackson ‘Enabling and constraining police power: on the moral regulation 
of policing. LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 23/2015.  
52 Ben Kinsella was the younger brother of Eastenders actress Brooke Kinsella and the family utilized 
the media attention to draw attention to teenage knife crime.  
53 Spencer Chainey and Ian Macdonald, ‘Stop and Search, the Use of Intelligence and Geographic 
Targeting’ (National Police Improvement Agency 2012). 
54 Lord Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2008 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006. (London: June 2009) [140]. 
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Gloucestershire police that the policy of serving s.44 notices was intended to prevent 
protests from taking place.55 In 2005 the powers were used to search train-spotters at a 
station that had been included on a Home Office list of possible terror targets.56 The 
most egregious abuse of s44 involved Walter Wolfgang, an 82-year-old anti-war 
activist, Labour Party member, holocaust survivor and senior member of the Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament. On 28 September 2005 he was ejected from the Labour 
Party Conference for heckling the Foreign Secretary, prevented from re-entering the 
secure zone and searched under s.44. The debacle received significant press attention 
and the Labour party were forced to apologise. 57 It later emerged that 600 protestors 
had been searched at the conference, none of whom had been suspected of terrorist 
activities and none were arrested. 58 
 
Statewatch, the civil liberties monitoring organisation, also noted many instances of 
s.44 being used against photographers to prevent them taking photos of police and 
public buildings.59  Jess Herd was detained for 45 minutes whilst photographing a 
wedding in London Docklands in 2008. 60  The BBC photographer Jeff Overs was 
stopped whilst taking photos of St. Paul’s cathedral in 2009. 61  Grant Smith was 
stopped whilst photographing Christ Church in the City of London by seven police 
officers and an ITV film crew who attempted to cover the incident were also told to 
stop filming. 62  Both The Independent and The British Journal of Photography 
launched campaigns against the police harassment of photographers under counter-
terrorism laws. In 2008 Lord Carlisle noted five examples of beat officers in Greater 
Manchester, Sussex and South Wales using s.44 when no authorisation was in place.63 
In 2009 he noted examples of the police stopping and searching white people for the 
sole purpose of improving the racial proportionality in s.44 statistics.64 In a study of 
the community effects of s.44 use it was noted that common outcomes of searches 
were alcohol confiscation, verbal warnings, the dispersal of groups under the Anti 
Social Behaviour Act 2003 and cannabis cautions. As one empirical study concluded, 
the power was used in ‘speculative intrusions and the governance of less serious 
crime.’65 
                                            
55 Jamie Wilson, ‘Terrorism Act “used to halt protest”’ The Guardian 16 July 2003. 
56 Michael Shiner and Rebekah Delsol, ‘The politics of the powers’. in (eds Rebekah Delsol and Michael 
Shiner) Stop and Search: The Anatomy of a Police Power (London: Palgrave, 2015). 
57 Andrew Sparrow, ‘Heckler, 82, who dared call Straw a liar is held under terrorist law’ The Telegraph 
29 September 2005. 
58 ‘Over 600 held under terror act at Labour conference’ The Scotsman 3 October 2005. 
59 Max Rowlands, ‘UK: The Misuse of Section 44 stop and search powers continues despite European 
Court Ruling’ http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-105-uk-section-44.pdf [accessed 25 February 
2015]. 
60 ibid. 
61 J. Davenport, ‘BBC man in terror quiz for photographing St Paul’s sunset’ London Evening Standard 
27 November. 
62 Rowlands. 
63 Lord Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2007 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006. (London: June 2008) [125]. 
64 Lord Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2008 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006. (London: June 2009) [140]. 
65 Alpa Parmar, ‘Stop-and-search in London: counter- terrorist or counter-productive?’ Policing and 
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Parliamentary scrutiny 
 
Lord Carlile was a vocal opponent of police overuse of s.44. His report on operation of 
the Terrorism Act during 2002 and 2003 raised concerns, particularly in relation to 
rolling 28-day authorisations in London and the disparity in patterns of use on the 
ground.66 He found it hard to understand ‘why s.44 authorisations are perceived to be 
needed in some force areas but not others with strikingly similar risk profiles.’67 Lord 
Carlile was certain that s.44 could be used less frequently without risk to public safety. 
The public, he asserted, could legitimately expect ‘that they will only face police 
intervention in their lives…if there is reasonable suspicion that they will commit a 
crime.’68 In many cases the search could not be justified and, he asserted, ‘a s.44 
search has never led to the finding of any terrorism material [or] provided a link in the 
terrorism chain.’69 Where reasonable suspicion existed, he wrote, other powers (e.g. 
s.43 TA or s.1 PACE) should be used. Yet during Lord Carlile’s tenure, s.44 use 
sharply increased! The government failed to address his concerns, or to acknowledge 
that official guidance was having little effect on the overuse of these so-called 
exceptional powers. The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) also criticised the 
use of s.44 against peaceful protestors and its potential interference with rights to 
freedom of speech and assembly.70 The JCHR and Lord Carlile’s reports had minimal 
immediate effect on the use of the powers, but marked a change in the political tide 
and were important in civil litigation before the ECtHR.  
 
Legal challenges during the rise 
 
Legal challenges to s.44 were mounted after police employed it at a demonstration 
against an arms fair in East London on 9 September 2003. The challenges did not fare 
well in the UK courts and whilst s.44 use continued to escalate, the landmark case of 
Gillian & Quinton progressed all the way to the European Court of Human Rights. The 
claimants were attending the demonstration when the police stopped and searched 
them under s.44.  Mr Gillan, a 26-year-old PhD student, was attending as a peaceful 
protestor and Ms Quinton, a journalist, intended to document the protests.  
 
The claimants’ cases were taken up by Liberty. s.44 was challenged on the grounds 
that the requirement of expedience did not sufficiently circumscribe such intrusive 
powers, that the rolling authorisations across London were excessive and not 
                                                                                                                              
Society (2011) 21(4), 369-382. 
66 Lord Carlile, ‘Report on the Operation in 2002 and 2003 of the Terrorism Act 2000’ (2004). 
67 Lord Carlile, ‘Report on the Operation in 2005 of the Terrorism Act 2000’ (2006) para 97. 
68 Ibid 100. 
69 Conrad Libischer, ‘Police Use and Misuse of S.44 Stop-and-Search Against Non-Violent Protest in 
Mainland Britain from February 2001 to July 2007’ [2007] Unpublished Dissertation, MA 
Criminology & Criminal Justice, King’s College London. 
70 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Demonstrating Respect for Rights? A Human Rights Approach 
to Policing Protest’ (2009). 
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anticipated by the statue, that the deployment of s.44 against peaceful protestors was 
contrary to the legislative purpose and that s.44 had become part of day-to-day 
policing. Arguments were advanced under the Human Rights Act 1998: stop-and-
search backed by criminal sanction constituted a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 
of the ECHR; interfered with the Article 8 right to private life; and, when misused 
against protestors, infringed rights to freedom of expression and assembly under 
Articles 10 and 11. Central to these arguments was the contention that the provisions 
could not be considered ‘prescribed by law’ because they were insufficiently 
circumscribed, especially at the level of the individual officer on the street. The UK 
courts rejected all arguments at every stage of the appeal process. The Divisional Court 
dismissed the action on 31 October 2003 71  and the Court of Appeal reached its 
judgment on 9 July 2004.72 The case then proceeded to the House of Lords where it 
was heard on 25 and 26 January 2006, judgment was given on 8 March of that year.73 
 
The Courts consistently found in favour of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and 
the Secretary of State. But they clearly did so on the basis that the statutory scheme of 
s.44 provided an exceptional power to be used in exceptional circumstances and for 
limited purposes. The finding that s.44 did not infringe individual rights was based on 
an explicit assumption that the power would only be used for the stated purpose to 
combat terrorism. The judgments of the Lords were littered with warnings about 
improper use of counter-terrorism powers. Lord Bingham made reference to using the 
power against political hecklers as an infringement of Article 10 rights (a reference to 
the Walter Wolfgang affair). Lord Hope argued that the best ‘safeguard against the 
abuse of power in practice is likely to be found in the training, supervision and 
discipline of the constables which are to be entrusted with its exercise.’ Lord Brown 
repeated Lord Carlile’s call for the powers to be used sparingly and warned that 
indiscriminate use may ‘imperil good community relations.’ 
 
Law and policing during the rise in suspicionless searches  
 
Despite the Law Lords’ concern about the rising use of suspicionless searches in 
situations which did not pertain to counter-terrorism, s.44 use rose fourfold in the year 
after the judgment and peaked a year later at over 250,000 searches.74 The judgment in 
favour of the Metropolitan Police provided tacit approval for the rapidly-emerging 
pattern of use. While suspicionless searches rose, protests about the invasion of 
traditional civil liberties gained momentum. Changes in the wider context, which 
included growing fear of terrorism and panic about knife crime, undoubtedly affected 
the speed at which political and legal challenges had an effect but did not halt them. 
                                            
71 R. (on the application of Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2003] EWHC 2545 
(Admin). 
72 R. (on the application of Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2004] EWCA Civ 1067. 
73 R. (on the application of Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12. 
74 Lord Carlile, ‘Report on the Operation in 2010 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006’ (2011). 
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The obvious, but nonetheless crucial, point here is that the rise in the use of 
suspicionless searches is manifestly not the result of substantive changes in the law. 
Rather, the political, organisational and cultural factors shaping the police use of the 
wide discretion offered by the statutes offers a compelling explanation for the radical 
increases in their use. However, the law not was entirely irrelevant. Here, we think, the 
lack of change in law had an effect on police operational practice. The consistent 
failure of legal challenges to s.44 provided tacit, if not explicit, judicial support for the 
use of suspicionless search powers and seems to have emboldened police officers of all 
ranks to believe they could employ an assertive, even aggressive, approach to everyday 
street policing.  
 
As might be expected, there was a significant spike in the use of s.44 after the 7 July 
2005 attacks but its use decreased the following year. Crucially, however, a major shift 
in police policy occurred in June 2007 in the aftermath of the attempted bombings in 
the Haymarket and the partially successful attack at Glasgow airport. In a report to the 
Metropolitan Police Authority, Assistant Commissioner John Yates, then MPS 
counter-terrorism lead, wrote that, following these events, ‘the MPS took the strategic 
decision to increase the use of s.44 to deter offenders and prevent further attacks.’75 
This point underlines our first hypothesis that police practice is best explained by the 
complex interaction between law, politics and work. The work element of an 
environmental theory of policing requires an analysis of the ‘vertical’ dimension of 
organisational policy and the ‘horizontal’ dimension occupational culture comprised of 
norms, values, axioms, routines and recipes for action. Taken together, these elements 
of the working environment play a key role in shaping operational practice in relation 
to the use of suspicionless search powers.  
 
In one sense, however, this change has everything to do with law. The police – as 
officers of the law – decided to use their statutory powers to interfere with the liberty, 
privacy and freedom of movement of many thousands of individuals. However, this 
change cannot be understood by changes in ‘black letter law’ since there were none. 
All that had happened in terms of formal law (i.e. statute and judicial decisions) during 
the very sharp increase in the use of the powers was that the status quo was confirmed. 
Since there was no change in law, it seems clear that change in police practice is 
attributable to changes in operational policy and the occupational culture of the rank-
and-file officers who carried out the policy. This change illustrates the interaction 
between the habitus and field of policing. It suggests a shift in the justification for the 
use of police power towards one that is explicitly oriented towards crime-control 
values and the assumption that patrol officers can deter violent crime and terrorism 
through aggressive policing. Drawing on Chan’s terminology, this ‘axiomatic change’ 
is accompanied by new ‘directory’ and ‘recipe’ knowledge about acceptable ways of 
interacting with the public. It is seems evident that changes in the political 
                                            
75 AC J Yates, ‘Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 - Tactical Use Review’ (Metropolitian Police Authority, 
7 May 2009) <http://policeauthority.org/metropolitan/committees/sop/2009/090507/10/index.html> 
accessed 25 February 2015. 
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environment, including zero tolerance rhetoric along with public fears about terrorist 
attacks and rising knife crime, led to changes to both the vertical (policy) and 
horizontal (cultural) elements of the police working environment and it was these that 
led to the escalating use of suspicionless search powers. 
 
Explaining the Decline and Fall of Suspicionless Searches 
 
While there were clearly environmental changes that affected the public acceptance of 
suspicionless searches, the sections of society disproportionately affected by police 
action on the ground, and other bodies set up to hold the police to account, were vocal 
opponents to the climbing use of these powers. As more people were subjected to 
suspicionless searches – often experienced as an unjustified intrusion into privacy and 
liberty – a ‘tipping point’ was reached.76 A significant element in this change was the 
pushback against the powers mounted by a number of the civil society organisations – 
including Liberty, Justice, Human Rights Watch, the Institute of Race Relations, 
Statewatch and The Runnymede Trust – who campaigned against the powers. News 
media across the political spectrum and specialist media such as the British Journal of 
Photography took up the issue. Governmental organisations charged with holding the 
government to account were also critical. The Metropolitan Police Authority raised 
questions about the use of the power as early as 2005. As discussed above, Lord Carlile 
was highly critical of s.44 use in his annual reports from 2003 onwards. The 
relationship between politics and police practice is not linear, but the chorus of 
disapproval that rose during the 2000s reached a crescendo towards the end of the 
decade. By 2009, as the general election campaign began, the political tide turned 
against the power and its use began to fall. 
 
Doubts within police circles about the value of s.44 were also evident by 2006. 
Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman, then UK counter-
terrorism lead, said, ‘I am not sure what purpose it serves, especially as it upsets so 
many people, with some sections of our community feeling unfairly targeted.  It seems 
a big price to pay […] we have to question the way we use a power that causes so 
much pain to the community we serve, but results in so few arrests or charges. Is it 
worth it?’77 On 2 December 2008, the Home Office issued new guidelines on the 
authorisation of stop-and-search powers under s.44. Then on 7 May 2009, the MPS 
made a strategic decision to restrict the use of s.44 across the capital. In a report to the 
Metropolitan Police Authority, the MPS said that following the MPA’s London Debate 
they had consulted widely, which had  ‘confirmed suggestions that the power is seen as 
controversial and has the potential to have a negative impact, particularly on minority 
communities.’ The findings supported a ‘three-layered approach to the tactical 
deployment of Terrorism Act powers’. This policy retained the use of s.44 powers in 
various ‘iconic sites’ of ‘key strategic importance’ across London. Otherwise the 
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power would be deployed by Management Board or via the Security Review 
Committee, on a ‘prevent and deter’ basis. The policy stated that ‘it is expected that 
[the power] will be used sparingly unless there is a significant change in threat.’ 
Finally, where officers see behaviour or circumstances that raise suspicion of a 
terrorist-related offence, they have discretion to use s.43, which permits searches for 
items connected with terrorism on the basis of reasonable suspicion. This new policy 
signalled the intention to radically reduce the use of s.44 powers. The decisions taken 
by MPS were mirrored by a similar policy change by the British Transport Police, the 
second most frequent user of s.44, in February 2009.78 
 
Legal challenges and the fall in suspicionless searches 
 
Gillan & Quinton v United Kingdom progressed to the European Court of Human 
Rights in May 2009 and judgment was handed down on 12 January 2010. The Court 
held that the coercive powers under s.44 interfered with the right to respect for private 
life under Article 8.79 In order for an interference with Article 8 to be justified it must 
be ‘in accordance with the law’, pursue a ‘legitimate aim’ and be ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’. s.44 fell at the first hurdle; although it had a basis in domestic law, 
it failed to meet the rule of law requirements to protect against arbitrary interference 
with individual rights. The court opined that the requirement of ‘expedience’ at the 
authorisation stage placed almost no restraint on senior police officers, so applicants 
would ‘face formidable obstacles in showing any authorisation and confirmation to be 
an abuse of power.’80 The rolling authorisation programme in London demonstrated 
that the geographical and temporal restrictions placed on s. 44 provided no restriction 
at all in practice.81  The primary cause for concern was the ‘breadth of discretion 
conferred on the individual officer.’ 82  The lack of any need for even subjective 
suspicion led the court to conclude that there was ‘a clear risk of arbitrariness in the 
grant of such broad discretion to the police officer.’83 The powers breached Article 8; 
they were not in ‘accordance with the law.’ 
 
Despite the ECtHR ruling that s.44 searches were incompatible with the ECHR and 
were therefore unlawful, the police continued to use these powers for more than a 
year84 until March 2011 when the UK government responded by replacing s.44 with 
s.47A. This amended the requirements so that a senior officer must reasonably expect 
acts of terrorism to take place and consider it ‘necessary’ to authorise use of the 
powers. Given that the breadth of discretion s.44 gave to individual officers was the 
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main cause of concern for the Strasbourg court, s.47A may still not comply with 
Article 8, but at the time of writing the power has never been used in England and 
Wales and has been used only once in Northern Ireland.85 
 
More recently, a legal challenge to s.60 was mounted by Ann Juliette Roberts, who 
was searched following a dispute with a ticket inspector on a bus in north London. The 
bus stop where Ms Roberts disembarked was in an area where a s.60 authorisation had 
been put in place two hours earlier. The police officer questioning Ms Roberts 
conducted a s.60 search because, in the officer’s opinion, it was not unusual for 
middle-aged women in the area to be carrying offensive weapons. Liberty joined the 
case and made representations on behalf of Ms Roberts. Arguments were made under 
Articles 5 and 8 as well as Article 14, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of 
race. s.60 use has fallen disproportionately on Black communities, with Black people 
being up to 28 times more likely to be searched under s.60 than whites during the 
2008/09 peak. All the arguments failed in the divisional court,86 the Court of Appeal87 
and recently in the Supreme Court. 88  The ECtHR have refused to consider an 
application on Roberts without giving detailed reasons for a refusal on 
admissibility.  Nonetheless, this case has had a fairly profound impact on the use of 
section 60.89  
 
The police reaction to the Roberts case was significantly different to that following 
their success in Gillan. Instead of assuming that success in the UK courts amounted to 
tacit approval of these measures, under pressure from the Home Office, the police pre-
empted the possibility of the case progressing to Strasbourg. The day that Roberts 
received permission to proceed to the courts, Craig Mackey, MPS Deputy 
Commissioner, wrote to all Chief Constables and Commissioners informing them of 
the challenge.90 This was followed by new guidance on s.60 authorisations, requiring 
them to be ‘necessary’, rather than merely ‘expedient’. As in the case of s.44 it is not 
changes in the law affecting police practice. It is changes in police operational policy 
in response to a lack of change in the law and perhaps in anticipation of defeat in 
Strasbourg.  
 
The End of Suspicionless Searches? 
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The politics of stop-and-search shifted radically in the run up-to the 2010 general 
election. The use of suspicionless powers peaked in 2008/9 at the end of the Labour 
government’s third term. Having ‘overtaken the Conservatives on the right’ in their 
criminal justice and law enforcement policies,91 New Labour’s zero-tolerance rhetoric 
seemed at odds with a public mood that had become sceptical of the value of 
suspicionless search powers and concerned about their abuse. Rather than upping the 
law and order rhetoric, the Conservative opposition pledged to curtail state intrusion 
into the private lives of individuals. In June 2009, then opposition leader David 
Cameron said that the Conservatives would roll back Labour’s ‘control state’ and scrap 
s.44.92 Citing the search of Andrew Pelling MP while photographing a cycle path,93 
Cameron declared that the powers were used unnecessarily. The 2010 Conservative 
election manifesto pledged to restore civil liberties. It accused Labour of creating the 
‘worst of all worlds – intrusive, ineffective and enormously expensive’. It had 
‘replaced trust with suspicion’ and subjected ‘Britain’s historic freedoms to 
unprecedented attack.’ Following the election, the new Home Secretary Theresa May, 
told the House of Commons: ‘I will not allow the continued use of s.44 in 
contravention of the European Court’s ruling and, more importantly, in contravention 
of the civil liberties of every one of us.’94  
 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission, which had long been concerned about 
stop-and-search powers, also began to focus on s.44 and subsequently s.60.95 In a 
highly influential report, entitled Stop and Think, the Commission concluded that 
police use of PACE stop and search powers was sometimes unlawful, disproportionate, 
discriminatory and damaging to relations within and between communities. It raised 
challenging questions about the effectiveness of stop and search powers and led to 
enforcement action by the EHRC against the worst performing police forces. The shift 
in the political environment and the publication of the EHRC reports stimulated 
engagement between academics, lawyers, senior police officers and civil liberties 
groups who came together to discuss ways of achieving fair and accountable use of 
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stop and search powers. One product of this engagement was the creation, in 
November 2010, of StopWatch a coalition of academics, lawyers and young activists 
that was launched at King’s College London by the Reverend Jesse Jackson. 
StopWatch has, since then, worked closely with police services, government, lawyers 
and young people to improve the use of stop and search powers. It has used a variety of 
mechanisms – including policy briefings, video, flash mobs, and theatre – to stimulate 
public debate about what young people want from the police, how stop and search 
powers could be improved and of alternative ways of carrying out good policing. 
 
Stop-and-search came under renewed security in the wake of the summer riots of 2011. 
Interviews with rioters identified stop-and-search as a major source of discontent and a 
motivation for rioting. 96  An independent ‘Communities and Victims’ panel set up by 
the government in the aftermath of the riots concluded that ‘Where young law-abiding 
people are repeatedly targeted there is a very real danger that stop-and-search will have 
a corrosive effect on their relationship with the police.’ 97 Continued concern led Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to undertake a thematic inspection of 
the fairness and effectiveness of stop-and-search powers in 2013. HMIC found that 
‘most officers have not received any training in the use of stop-and-search powers 
since they joined the service’ and ‘in the absence of regular training... police officers 
are developing habits which are learned through watching and listening to others.’98 
HMIC concluded that stop-and-search without reasonable grounds caused 
dissatisfaction and upset, and although some think it will help ‘control the streets’ in 
the short-term, it may lead to major disorder in the long term. The report concluded 
that ‘[o]verpolicing or heavy-handed policing can prompt defiance.’99 
 
Anticipating the findings of the HMIC report, the Home Secretary launched a public 
consultation on stop-and-search in July 2013. The consultation yielded more than 
5,000 submissions and in April 2014 the Home Secretary set out a package of reforms 
to the use of police stop-and-search powers, especially those without reasonable 
suspicion. The reforms aimed to ensure that the power is targeted where there is 
genuine reasonable suspicion, to increase the proportion of stops resulting in arrest and 
to reduce the overall use of the powers. When the Home Secretary announced the 
reforms she said that ‘if the numbers do not come down, if stop-and-search does not 
become more targeted, if those stop-to-arrest ratios do not improve considerably, the 
government will return with primary legislation to make those things happen.’100  
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Discussion 
 
This paper set out to explain the sharp rise and sudden fall in the police use of 
suspicionless search powers in the two decades between 1994 and 2014. This is, in our 
view, a substantively important question in its own right and one that should be of 
interest to legal scholars. The paper also seeks to contribute to a broader and more 
general theoretical question: what is the relationship between ‘black letter’ law in the 
books and ‘blue letter’ law in on the streets? In this concluding part, we try to draw out 
a tentative answer to the general question by answering the more specific one. 
 
The example of the rise and fall of suspicionless searches confirms the hypothesis, 
based on Grimshaw and Jefferson’s environmental theory of policework, that police 
practice is explicable as the complex interaction between law, work and politics. The 
evidence also supports the hypothesis that law is the determinant structure that shapes 
policework. Law defines the objects of policing and the scope and methods used by the 
police to interact with members of the public. It should and does define the limits of 
coercive and intrusive powers. There is a caveat, however: empirical research indicates 
that the police did in fact conduct suspicionless searches before 1994 even though 
these were outwith the law. This raises significant questions about the limits of the rule 
of law to restrain police power.101 Nonetheless, statute law authorised suspicionless 
powers in the first instance and it is clear that once these powers were granted to the 
police by the CJPOA 1994, they were used to a greater and greater extent over the next 
decade.  
 
Understanding the law is also essential to explaining why these powers dwindled 
towards insignificance five years past the peak of their use. The broad and unrestrained 
power to use suspicionless searches in the context of counter terrorism ceased to be 
available to be used lawfully by the police when s.44 was replaced by s.47A. Most 
important in this process was the progress of Gillan through the courts. This case had a 
significant impact initially in tacitly permitting the use of suspicionless searches and 
then, following the decision of the ECtHR in November 2010, in bringing their use in 
counterterrorism to an end. Again a caveat: s.44 use had already begun to fall before 
the ruling and some searches continued even after the judgement was issued. Gillan 
also had important knock-on effects on the use of s.60 as a power similarly lacking 
circumscription and the legal challenge to s.60 in Roberts had an effect on police 
policy and practice.  
 
Our examination of suspicionless searches shows that an analysis of the law is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to explain police practice. As predicted by the 
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environmental approach, despite its determinant effect on police practice, law is far 
from the dominant influence. Although ‘law in the books’ determines whether the 
police may use a particular lawful power, it cannot explain how frequently they 
actually use such powers, against whom, or in what circumstances. The central 
argument of this paper is that explaining how the use of statutory powers – especially 
its extent – is shaped by police constables as ‘officers of the law’ requires detailed 
analysis of the police working environment comprised of political, organisational and 
cultural factors as well as legal factors. 
 
Crucial to understanding changes in the use of suspicionless searches are changes in 
the political field. The mid-1990s can be seen as the high point of authoritarian ‘law 
and order’ policies resulting from the bidding war between the Conservatives and 
Labour to become the party toughest on crime and disorder. The suspicionless search 
powers granted by the CJOPA 1994 and the Terrorism Act 2000 were intended to be 
exceptional powers, but encouraged by New Labour’s ‘tough on crime’ and ‘zero-
tolerance’ rhetoric, their objects expanded until they were used routinely, especially 
after major public anxieties about knife crime and terrorism. By 2010, suspicionless 
searches were used twenty times more frequently than when they were first introduced. 
 
The dramatic fall in the use of suspicionless search powers also requires an 
understanding of other changes in the field and the effect these had on the habitus of 
policing – its administrative policies and occupational culture. Civil society 
organisations, the mass media, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission and Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary, 
and the shift by the Conservative Party to a much more libertarian stance all played a 
role. A new civil society organisation – StopWatch – was formed to engage in research 
and action for fair and accountable policing and played a role in this process. The 2011 
riots and the public reaction to these identified stop-and-search as part of the ‘toxic 
mix’ leading to resentment and anger towards the police. There is compelling evidence 
that these changes in the field had an impact on the habitus of policing, with changes in 
organisational policy and occupational culture within the police organisation leading to 
changes in the extent to which the powers were used.  
 
Stop-and-search powers are created by law; but that law is highly permissive in 
defining how the powers may be used. The extent to which they can be used, against 
whom and in what circumstances is an operational policy matter that is shaped by 
elements of the habitus interacting with the field of policing. Returning to our 
environmental hypotheses about policing practice, it is evident that suspicionless 
powers are more permissive and have a less substantial and precisely articulated legal 
structure than those requiring reasonable suspicion (e.g. s1 PACE). They are therefore 
more susceptible to being shaped by work-related values evident in police occupational 
culture and administrative policies. As environmental theory of policing predicts, the 
more permissive, discretionary and ambiguous the law, the greater the opportunity for 
occupational common sense to shape police practice. This clearly illustrates the 
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potential for substantial changes in the use of police powers irrespective, or in the 
absence, of changes in law. 
 
This analysis has implications for the use of s.1 PACE, especially in relation to the 
occurrence of unlawful suspicionless searches carried out by police officers under this 
statute. Although PACE searches require ‘reasonable suspicion’, in more than a quarter 
of the cases examined by HMIC in 2012 no grounds for suspicion were recorded.102 
This observation – and its impact on public confidence in policing – became the focus 
of the Home Secretary’s reforms. The attempts to tighten the PACE code of practice – 
by narrowing the definition of reasonable suspicion and introducing sanctions for 
police officers breaching the code – has the potential to reduce the use of the powers. 
As the environmental approach to understanding policework predicts, where policing 
tasks are strongly determined by law, administrative systems, managerial directives 
and supervision need not fail to regulate police powers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A twenty-year experiment with suspicionless searches in England and Wales seems to 
have come to conclusive end. The powers rose exponentially from the mid-1990s to 
2009 and then dropped dramatically; s.44 has been repealed; s.47A has never been 
used on the mainland, and new guidance leaves s.60 significantly curtailed. The extent 
of the use of suspicionless search powers in 2016 was but the faintest echo (less than 
one per cent) of the extensive and aggressive enforcement that characterised policing 
five years earlier. Searches under PACE have come under scrutiny and their number is 
falling. A reform process that began in earnest in 2009 has gradually tightened police 
discretion, and the Home Office has made strenuous efforts to reduce stop-and-search 
in general. The overall effect has been to squeeze suspicionless searches, almost 
entirely, out of police practice through political and administrative means. The fall in 
the use of these powers may be claimed as a victory for those who assert the principle 
that police should only ever be permitted to search a person where there are genuine 
reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing. However, we remain concerned that a 
significant shift in the security situation or political landscape could trigger a 
resurgence of suspicionless searches. For this reason, we think it would be better if the 
powers were repealed by primary legislation. The theoretical and substantive evidence 
suggests that while the power to stop-and-search without suspicion remains on the 
statute book the danger persists that their use could increase without public debate or 
political consideration of the serious invasion of individual rights that these powers 
entail.
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